PEB 254 Report - Update 4/02/26
REPORT to THE PRESIDENT by EMERGENCY BOARD NO. 254
SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER DATED JANUARY 14, 2026 ESTABLISHING AN EMERGENCY BOARD TO INVESTIGATE DISPUTES BETWEEN LONG ISLAND RAIL ROAD AND BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS AND TRAINMEN; BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD SIGNALMEN; INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS; INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS; AND TRANSPORTATION COMMUNICATIONS UNION AND SECTION 9A OF THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT, AS AMENDED
(NMB Case Nos. A-14068, A-14070, A-14071, A-14076, A-14078)
WASHINGTON, D.C. MARCH 16, 2026
Post PEB 254 Articles:
LIRR strike looms after ‘Trump-appointed board’ sides with labor unions
PEB 254 sides with rail labor unions in LIRR contract dispute, unions call on MTA to settle
LIRR strike looms after ‘Trump-appointed Board’ sides with labor unions
Second presidential emergency board sides with LIRR unions again in contract dispute with MTA, raising strike concerns
TCU: PEB 254 Decision and Status of Negotiations – March 16, 2026
https://tculocal90.org/news/peb-254-decision-and-status-of-negotiations-march-16-2026/
Comments:
Regarding the PEB 254 Report, the statutory language appears quite clear that the 2nd PEB is limited to selecting either of the two offers submitted by the parties and the selection criteria is the determination of the most reasonable offer. PEB 254 specifically states it made its determination consistent with statutory language, although it gratuitously added language acknowledging its consistency with PEB 253 as has other 2nd PEBs have historically followed the respective 1st PEBs recommendations:
“Based on the foregoing analysis of both the respective wage offers and the Carrier’s work rule proposals, we find that the Organizations’ Final Offer is the most reasonable offer. It is also the Final Offer closest to the Recommendation of PEB 253. While we agree that we are not bound by the Report and Recommendation of PEB 253, and we have in fact made an independent analysis of the issues before us, historically second PEBs have selected the offer that more closely reflects the recommendation of the first PEB that investigated the particular dispute. In the instant dispute, that offer is the Organizations’ Final Offer.” PEB 254 Report, page 41.
Consistent with the above Articles, with the rendering of the PEB 254 Report, a status quo continues for 60 days and “the parties are free to engage in self-help” thereafter, unless an agreement is reached or there is congressional intervention. See. 4. Post-PEB Congressional Intervention with Table & Links.
In that the parties have already gone through a 270 day, two PEB procedure (see 2.4. Collective Bargaining/Mediation Process Charts), it would be torturous to put then through another “Advisory Board” process, but that is what was done in the matter of the only other commuter railroad in a similar situation, the LIRR and several labor organizations after the completion of PEBs 210 and 212. Another option used in the past includes imposition of conditions tied to PEB recommendations, often with a special board/panel to resolve issues needing clarification, interpretation or any “unresolved issues.” Finally, on a few occasions an arbitration process was used to finalize the dispute, including a once used “last-best-offer” arbitration, see PL 102-306 involving PEBs 220, 221, and 222.
However, a different/modified approach could be used that combines the imposition of the so-called pattern and sending the disputed “addition” to the pattern to arbitration.
Also, there could be neither congressional involvement nor agreement, leaving the parties to their “self-help,” as they did with the LIRR - UTU dispute in 1994. 3.5 Strikes in the Railroad and Airline Industries - May 2025 Update.
Returning to PEB 253, the 1st PEB, it is important to note that the “pattern” terminology and rationale used in PEB 253 is significantly inconsistent with “pattern” terminology and rationale traditionally used in PEBs. For example, PEB 253 specifically states:
“The principle of pattern bargaining, however, should not be applied in a manner that effectively deprives these Organizations of their ability to independently bargain under the RLA.” PEB 253, page 50 and 51.
In PEB 116, the Board sets forth a number points on page 13, often referenced in subsequent PEBs that supported “pattern bargaining,” that are significantly different than PEB 253’s stated view:
“Among other reasons for our decision to approve and recommend adoption of the settlement pattern plan are the following:
1. It is right and sound and fair that the remaining 20 percent of railroad employees be given the same package protection (and asked to forego similar demands) as their fellow workers in the 80 percent who have already agreed to a 3-year settlement.
2. The pattern plan offers the best hope of preventing discriminatory treatment among the various crafts.
3. No specific challenge of the propriety and fairness of the pattern settlement has come from any leader of the Organization or from any of the highly knowledgeable and experienced witnesses who gave testimony before this Board.
4. Earlier pattern plans have proven their worth as stabilizing influences.
Pattern bargaining has resulted in the recommendation of settlements consistent with the pattern agreements. The PEB 253 approach/rationale may help explain its determination but is directly at odds with traditional application of pattern bargaining.
PEB 253 identified the Carrier’s (LIRR)) position regarding its settlements, and the MTA-wide pattern, but avoided making a determination of the issue. Instead, PEB 253 stated, “The pattern/not a pattern question, however, is of largely academic concern in this case because both the Carrier and the Organizations agree that the GWIs for the first three years are to be 3%, 3%, and 3.5% – a settlement that is consistent with all of the Agreements reached by the Carrier during this round of bargaining.” Basically, three years of both parties four year proposals matched and were “consistent with all the Agreements reached by the Carrier during this round of agreement bargaining.” It should be noted, PEB 253 refrained from making a determination of whether a pattern existed in the Carrier’s four-year proposals or its three-year proposals and actual settlements. Also, it should be noted that PEB 253 acknowledged the Carrier’s resistance to adding the fourth year to its previously asserted pattern. See PEB 253, page 11.
PEB 253 framed these 3 years of wage increases as a “three-year pattern” and, then, created an approach to add and justify a fourth year of wage increases to its so-called pattern recommendation where there was no agreement/settlement:
“The question is presented as to whether it would violate pattern principles if the Organizations in this dispute negotiated a fourth year when the organizations that have already settled have not done so. After careful consideration, we are unpersuaded that, in this case, pattern principles deprive the Organizations of their ability to negotiate a fourth year, either to address the impact of inflation or for other reasons.”
PEB 253 Report raises significant issues based on its inconsistencies with prior PEB Reports on the subject of pattern bargaining:
· PEB 253 devised its so-called three-year pattern from parts of proposals from the parties that were in common; this is dramatically inconsistent with determining patterns based on actual settlements and recommending such settlements to similarly situated parties.
· The concept of adding an additional year of wage increases to a pattern settlement recommendation is an anathema to the concept of “pattern bargaining”.
The foregoing is not meant to state there was a pattern or not and is offered solely for noting the inconsistency in the PEB 253 Report on the subject of “pattern bargaining.”
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is recognized that there are legitimate issues that have rationalized slight modification of valid pattern settlements, and, in one instance, PEB 225 Soo Line - UTU, that resulted in the rejection of the application of a clear local-internal pattern in favor of a national pattern base on a disproportionate impact concept.